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ESSAYS
ON
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY.





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ON

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

BY

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TO
ABDUS SALAM RAFIQI
AS A
TOKEN OF ESTEEM.

PREFACE.

IN this short study of Islamic Philosophy I have only dealt with some of the leading features ; being in Rangoon while the greater part of my library is in Belfast I have had to confine myself principally to the works mentioned in the text, to the writers of which I beg to acknowledge my indebtedness. Sketchy and all as it is I can only hope that in Islam it may create a renewed interest in the subject. If it should, I trust present day Muslims will not rest satisfied with the conclusions arrived at by their fathers, but remember that philosophy has been enriched since their time by generation after generation of further experiences, and been developed by a long line of earnest workers, and that it has been illuminated by the valuable and epoch-making discoveries and more reliable methods of modern science.

YEHYA-EN-NASR PARKINSON.



INTELLIGENCE.

A study on Philosophical Method.

AMID a babble of voices, amid a myriad different opinions, in the mixture and confusion of ideas, in the medley of representations that are thrust upon us on all sides, one is almost inclined to ask the question "Do people in general know what they are talking about" ? and after giving it due consideration to be forced practically to the conclusion that they do not. When we attempt to analyse what this conclusion means, we find, that it is simply a concise way of saying that people use terms loosely ; they use symbols, *i e.*, words, that represent (or at least ought to represent) certain definite facts or ideas in an indefinite manner, or they use words ambiguously without attempting to attach to them a definite meaning or, by using the same word in different senses that contradict each other.

Words are symbols used for the economy of thought, in the abstraction of certain features of the world order, and they stand therefore, either for facts, or for the relation of facts to each other and to the whole of events. They represent certain definite perceptions, concepts, generalisations, syntheses and ideals present in our consciousness ; if they do not do this they are meaningless, and the more meaning-freighted they are of the more value they become.

Now, if the majority of people recognised this, would it not save a great deal of trouble, a great deal of worry, and a great deal of useless labour, more especially in the field of mental activity, in the region of mind ; in argument where idea is struggling with idea for the mastery. An examination will in the case of numerous arguments reduce them to incoherence by showing that the whole question is a loose definition of words.

Now, before we proceed any further, I will give a few illustrations to show more clearly what I mean. Freeman

in his "History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy," says, that a federal system in Greece was "utterly impossible," this is only true in the sense that that was impossible which did not occur, but as Robertson says :—

"Such a proposition would hold equally true of anything else that did not happen at a given time ; and it merely creates confusion to affirm it of one item in particular."

As an instance, if I were to assert that in Britain a Democratic system was "utterly impossible" of what value would my statement be? Of no practical value at all, any more than a statement made a thousand years ago that, a Democratic system in France was "utterly impossible" would have had. Comte, in one of his addresses, said:—"That we might survey the stars and measure their distances, but to tell the actual chemical elements of which they are composed was a discovery which, though pregnant with interest for us, we can never hope to attain." Yet, at the time of his address, the investigations were being carried out that were to solve the problem. Those instances, mark you, are not parallels of Freeman's statement, because there what was predicted as "utterly impossible" did actually occur but they show the absurdity of such statements.

Again, of what value is the phrase "utterly impossible"? If I say a thing is "impossible" what extra value do I add when I say a thing is "utterly impossible?" In other words, what is the difference between "impossible" and "utterly impossible"? It seems to me very like asserting that a banana has a "red" taste or that sugar has a "blue" sweetness.

Again, Freeman asserts that in Greece federation was undesirable as with it Greece could never have become the intellectual Greece we admire. Now this is mere verbiage, a waste of words. Greece, as we know it, was of course inseparably linked to the system of independant city Commonwealths ; but in spite of this it remains a rational proposition whether the cities could not have developed their culture further than they did had they federated. Besides, Greece fell, and its fall was just as inseparably linked with the separateness of the states,

Have we, therefore, to draw the deduction from Freeman's assertion, that the fall of Greece was desirable. This is practically what it leads to. *

I take another example from Jevon's "Introduction to the History of Religion." He says:—

(1) "*A belief is an inference and, as such, is the work of reason.* The reason endeavours to anticipate the movement of facts." (p. 403.)

(2) "It is an established fact of psychology that *every* act, *mental* or physical, requires the concurrence not only of reason and will but of emotion also." (p. 409.)

(3) "Indeed the reason of Primitive man was *ex hypothesi* undeveloped, and in any case, *religious belief is not an inference reached by reason*, but is the immediate consciousness of certain facts." (p. 210.)

To look at these three quotations one would almost be inclined to think, that language was in, what is commonly called, a "hopeless muddle." First we have the statement that a belief is the work of the reason, next we are told that every act, mental and physical, is the work not only of reason and will but of emotion, a contradiction of the first. In the third paragraph we have a statement that overthrows both of them. Here we are told religious belief is not reached by reason, and, what is worse, he goes on to say, "but is the immediate consciousness of certain facts." How a belief can arise from facts without reasoning on those facts I do not know. It seems to me nonsense; and what is meant by religious belief being "the immediate consciousness of certain facts," is to me incomprehensible.

If you predicate belief as the work or result of reason you must keep to the definition you have left down, to go on afterwards and call something a belief that is not the work of reason is a contradiction in language, an absurdity. Lastly, the difference between the mental acts of a savage and the reasoning powers of a Huxley or a Robertson is one of degree, not kind.

* See Robertson Int. Eng. Politics.

Finally, let us take an illustration from the writings of one of the world's Greatest Thinkers, Immanuel Kant : speaking of Experience, he calls it :—

“ A cognition which determines an object by means of perception.”

Again :—

“ Empirical knowledge has its sources *a posteriori*, *i.e.*, in experience.”

In the first case experience is equal to our mental activity and sensations ; it is identical with knowledge, which we describe as (i) a representation of facts in sentient symbols, *i.e.*, words, and (ii) as a description of facts.* In the second case experience is the sensuous impressions from which part of our knowledge comes, and is, therefore, identical with sensation. But Kant uses Experience in still a third sense, as follows :—

“ That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our sense and partly themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers into activity, to compare, to connect or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects which is called experience ?”

Here experience is used in the wide sense of the effects of events on sentient beings and includes not only every movement of our environment that affects us, but every feature we have inherited mentally and physically from the past. But what conclusion are we to draw from the following paragraph :—

“ Experience is without doubt the first product which our understanding brings forth in working out the raw materials of sensation.”

Now, remember, it is not a slovenly thinker who wrote that but Kant, in his “ Critique of Pure Reason ;” now

*Definition of Dr. Carus.

what troubles me is not what he actually means here by experience, but what kind of a thing is that "understanding" that brings forth experience in working out the raw materials of sensations. I was always under the impression that a person came to understand a thing through experience of it, but how a person comes to experience a thing through understanding, otherwise how a person can understand a thing of which he has no knowledge for experience is here equal to knowledge, I cannot understand. To be serious, what I want to impress is this, that those errors are principally due to a looseness and ambiguity in words and their meaning, and if Kant could make an error in reasoning you may be quite certain that you and I can do so; and such mistakes can only be obviated by the most precise and careful criticism.

The words God, soul, spirit, imagination, experience, reality, chance and intelligence, are in general use day by day yet how many people take the trouble of thinking out exactly what they mean by them, or of giving them a fixed value so that there can be no mistaking what the symbol stands for in their consciousness. Of course it is not necessary that a writer should take the trouble to define each of those words when he happens to mention them in an article; but it is necessary that he should attach to them a definite meaning, make them represent a definite idea or a set of ideas. Those who take the trouble to enquire will find that the generality of people have only a hazy idea of what they mean by any of the above words, and an attempt to explain them only leads to contradiction and confusion. A certain class of persons are very fond of asking you if you believe in this or if you believe in that, not seeming to recognise the absurdity of the question; some questions cannot be answered by a plain yes or no; and I generally answer such questions by asking another; for instance, when I am asked if I believe in the "soul," I reply by asking what they mean by the soul," and I may say I generally find that I do not believe in the kind of a "soul" they believe in.

The difficulty in dealing with the majority of philosophical problems is the difficulty of language brought about

by the variableness of the meaning of words and the lack of words to express new sets of ideas. Though we may not be able to solve the problem by overcoming the difficulties of language, we can at least indicate the nature of the problem, apply to it methodical criticism and lay down lines of reasoning that will give a practical solution of the philosophical aspect of the case. It is not necessary to deal with all the words given above, one of them will be sufficient, let us take the word "Intelligence" as I do not think it has been dealt with from a similar aspect before.

Let each of us ask ourselves what do we mean by "Intelligence"? You will understand that I am not here concerned with the common meaning as contained in the phrase "I have received intelligence concerning new complications in the political situation." Where the word is equal to "information" or "news." But I am concerned with the philosophical problem, what do we mean when we say:—"That boy has intelligence:" "That boy has more intelligence than this one," "Mr. so and so is exceptionally intelligent"?

Now, I should not advise you to rush to the dictionary for a definition because you will find there that "Intelligence" is intellectual skill or knowledge or a "spiritual being," so you will possibly have as much difficulty in defining the meaning of the terms of the meanings of "intelligence" as you would have in defining "intelligence." When I turned up "spiritual" I found one of its meanings is "immaterial" and I found "Being" meant "Existence" or "Substance" and that "Substance" meant "matter;" here we have the deduction that "Spiritual Being" means "immaterial matter," and also "Intelligence." "Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." It is such an absurdity as this we must try to avoid. And it can only be accomplished by severe self-criticism so as to attain to consistency of action and thought.

Schopenhauer considered casuality to be the sole function of "intelligence" and the formation of concepts to be the province of reason, to him reason marks of man.

from the brute. But is this differentiation possible? I do not think so. "The power of abstraction which collects the common features in a number of presentations is also found in the higher animals. Dogs, for instance, discriminate between different persons and between man and cat. While even cattle, sheep, deer and birds discriminate between friends and strangers, friends and foes; while the power of forming concepts is still so feeble in uncivilised races that it rises very little above the horse or dog. As Haeckel puts it—

"A long scale of reason unites the various stages of association of presentation which lead up to the formation of concepts, it is quite impossible to lay down a strict line of demarcation between the lower and higher mental functions of animals or between the latter and reason. The distinction between the two cerebral functions is only relative.

The central fact brought out in Haeckel's statement is one of the commonest in our experience and it is so because reality is a single whole without a break, and because we must think in abstractions. There is no true line of demarcation anywhere in nature, even the division of science into different fields is only arbitrary. Astronomy runs into Chemistry, Chemistry into Physiology and Physiology both into Psychology and Anthropology; the boundary of one extends into others. And yet Haeckel himself attempts to lay down what would appear to be a line of demarcation as follows:—

"Intelligence comprises the narrow circle of concrete and more proximate associations; while reason deals with the wider sphere of abstract and more comprehensive groups of association. In the scientific life of mind, therefore, the intelligence is always occupied with empirical investigation and reason with speculative knowledge. But the two faculties are equally functions of the phronema; and depend on the normal anatomic and chemical condition of the organ of thought."

It would seem from this that Haeckel is a supporter of the "Association" philosophy, to me the "Association" philosophy is like a lot of other philosophies, one-sided,

seeing only a part of the truth ; there are a number of things it does not explain and one of them is reason. Here I cannot discuss this philosophy. In the above definition of "Intelligence" I do not think that Haeckel has made any improvement on Schopenhauer, the definition that "intelligence is always occupied with empirical investigation and reason with speculative knowledge," will not stand the test of either "intelligence" or "reason" on its own definition. Are we to say that the engineer or the chemist dealing with empirical investigation has intelligence and call the mental operations of the savage speculating on "God" and "spirit" reason? Are we to say that the work of a great artist or sculptor has been accomplished by intelligence and that the laying food for his ancestor's ghost by the savage is the result of reason, if so, the result will be a reform of language. I am inclined to think, although, I have never investigated the matter enough to speak dogmatically on it ; that it is in speculative subjects we find the most inconsistency, namely, the worst "reasoning." In fact, I do not see how it is possible to get over the following definition of "Reason" given by Dr. Paul Carus in his *Primer of Philosophy*.

"Reason originates by a differentiation of the formal and the sensory in experience. As soon as the formal has been separated in thought from the sensory, as soon as an animal learns to speak, to count, and to think in abstracts it has developed reason. Reason does not rise out of the sensory element of our sensations and memory—images but out of their inter-relations. Reason is the product of the abstract thought-operations, and pure reason is a system of empty forms (such as Logic and Euclid) whose office it is to arrange in good order and to systematise further experience.

"Reason is not an arbitrary invention, it is not the product of a haphazard association; reason is the method of our experience and the norm of all thinking.

* * * *

"Reason is not purely subjective. Reason is objective in its nature. Our subjective reason, human reason, or the rationality of our mind grows out of that world-order

which we call the rationality of existence. Human reason is only the reflection of the world-reason, the former is rational only in so far as it agrees with the latter.

“Reason, *i.e.*, human reason, in its elementary beginnings consists first of the operations that take place among the mental images. Mental operations are the germ of reason, and mental operations are, as such, the same as any other operations, the same as any process that takes place in nature. Reason is, secondly, a mental picture of certain qualities of reality, it conveys information applicable to all reality. Then reason is, thirdly, an instrument which enables us methodically and critically to deal with any kind of experience.”

Haeckel, in another part of the same chapter of his “Wonders of Life,” not only overthrows his previous definition but still further confuses the meaning, it runs as follows:—

“Like every other function of our organism, the human mind shows development in two directions, in the individual and phylogenetically in the race. The last we cannot follow directly, we can only trace it by an examination of history, both social and mental, by comparison and synthesis, and by a study of the various stages of mental life in savage tribes and other vertebrates.

“The new-born child shows no trace of mind, reason or consciousness, these functions are wanting in it as completely as in the embryo during the nine months in the mother’s womb. Even in the ninth month, when most of the organs of the human embryo are formed and arranged as they appear later, there is no more trace of mind in the psychic life than in the ovum and spermatozoon from which it was evolved.

“The moment in which these sexual cells unite marks precisely the real commencement of individual existence, and therefore of the soul also (as a potential function of the plasm). But the mind proper, or reason, the higher conscious function of the soul only develops slowly and

gradually long after birth. Felchsig has shown, anatomically, the cortex of the new-born child is not yet organised or capable of functioning."

Here, "reason" is practically a synonym of "mind proper," the difficulty is in finding out what is actually meant by "mind proper." Perhaps the following paragraph which follows the above quotation may help us :—

"In defining the appearance of the individual mind by the awakening of self-consciousness, we make it possible to distinguish from the monistic physiological point of view between soul (psyche) and 'spirit' (pneuma). There is a soul even in the maternal ovum and the paternal spermatozoon, there is an individual soul even in the stem-cell (cytula) which arises at conception by the blending of the parent cells. But the mind proper, the thinking reason, develops out of the animal intelligence (or earlier instincts) of the child only with the consciousness of its personality as opposed to the outer world."

Here we are in opposition to the first definition and practically back to the position of Schopenhauer—a position he had already rejected. The moment when self-consciousness first appears will differ in different children but in the majority of the cases it appears at an early age.

I am much afraid that by this time you will have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to arrive at a satisfactory definition of what is meant by "intelligence"; however, I should advise you not to be impatient but to pursue the enquiry a little further. In the preceding the confusion seems to me to be between "reason" and "intelligence" in other words, the writers attempt to draw a line of demarcation, however arbitrary, between "reason" and "intelligence" that is the error; you can no more draw a line between reason and intelligence than you can between blueness and "sweetness," or between "redness" and "hardness" they do not belong to the same series, they are not links on the same chain following each other as cause and effect; but they are inseparable from and parallel to each other. Let me try to bring this out by a few short quotations,

Tyndall says:—

“In forming their notions of the origin of things our earliest historic ancestors pursued as far as their intelligence permitted the same course.”

Comte speaks of:—

“The mature state of our intelligence.

And again:—

“The human intelligence had to make use of ” etc.

Now, it is here evident that the word is used always in practically the same sense and that the meaning intended to be conveyed is the same as when we say “that man has great intelligence.” Perhaps the following from Huxley will assist us in elucidating the meaning:—

“The garden is in the same position as every other work of man’s art; it is a result of the cosmic process working through and by human energy and intelligence.”

Again:—

“I have contrasted with the state of nature the state of art, produced by human intelligence and energy, as it is exemplified by a garden, and I have shown that the state of art, here and elsewhere, can be maintained only by the constant counteraction of the hostile influences of the state of nature.”

Again:—

“In the exploration of the cosmic process....., the highest intelligence of man finds inexhaustible employment; giants are subdued to our service, and the spiritual affections of the contemplative philosopher are engaged by beauties worthy of eternal constancy.”

Here I think we have the correct sense in which the word ought to be used and there is no mistake in the meaning, although it may be difficult to define it; we can only try. Intelligence may be said to be the ability to utilise the data gathered by experience in any or every field of thought, either by turning the forces of nature to

our purpose or by the formation of new combinations. "Intelligence," therefore, depends on reason, namely on the correctness and consistency of our mental operations and its varying degrees depend on the logical development of those powers. But "intelligence" is not "reason" the words are not synonyms, neither is it a state that precedes or follows "reason" it is parallel to and co-exists alongside of "reason," it is the ability to reason correctly and to make practical use of the results arrived at, or, as Dr. Carus sums it up:—

"Intelligence is the ability of practically employing one's intellect."

Where "intellect" is defined as—

"The presence of such conditions as make cognition possible."

The definition of Carus is possibly as near as we can get, it covers not only the human intelligence but also the thought-operations of the whole animal kingdom. Here we have not done away with the difficulties of language but we have indicated the nature of the problem; laid down lines of reasoning to guide us in all such cases and thereby reduce error and confusion to a minimum.

Now, in the preceding remarks you will have noticed that I have dealt only with some of the latter-day Western thinkers. But misstatement of a case is not confined to them alone. It ramifies all thought from the earliest period to the present. We are each and all of us liable to inconsistencies of reasoning. There is within everyone a natural bias which makes us incline towards beliefs already accepted as against other or new theories presented to us or as against the beliefs of others; beliefs, already held have a tendency to bias our judgment in further investigations; in dealing with new theories the beliefs already held determine the result. The method of reasoning is no doubt simple enough but it is difficult of application. It behoves us therefore to apply strict criticism to our own opinions so as to keep us on the straight path; the path that leads to positive knowledge and truth. The old saying attributed to the Grecian oracle is a fundamental principle of criticism. "Man know thyself."

Consciousness is not something mysterious, it is the result of the whole organisation; neither is it something infallible, far from it. The most of us will remember that in the past we have done certain acts which afterwards we came to look upon as wrong and yet we acted conscientiously at the time. Also, we at one time held beliefs on certain things that we now consider to be false or to have been errors of judgment, consciousness is like every thing else in nature, or perhaps it might be better to say like all other results of causation; a transformation, a ceaseless change, a continual flux, through which new ideas are ever flowing and to which new material—fresh data or experience—is being ever added. Subject to the Law of Evolution it develops both in the individual and in the race. The result in the individual and in nations and peoples may be sometimes retrograde because depending on natural laws having their bases in the facilities for culture-contact, if those facilities are at zero progress becomes impossible and stagnation of thought results. But the general tendency in humanity as a whole, is progressive to higher ideals and nobler aspirations. The ideals of our childhood were quite different from the conception we now hold both in regard to phenomena and in our relationship to each other and to the all. Ideas that are now clear to us were in our childhood quite beyond the grasp of our intellect. And in the education of children we must always bear this point in mind. There is no use, neither is there any sense in teaching them formulas either in religion, science or philosophy that we know they will be unable to comprehend. To be effective a system of education must be methodical; and the method to be correct must be founded on experience, and experience, if it teaches anything at all, teaches that the mind develops gradually and that it can only absorb data by degrees. I have for instance read that short creed by Al-Gazali which is committed to memory by children, whether Muslims are now in the habit of making their children learn it I cannot say, but, if so, my advice is stop it immediately; it is not only a waste of time but it may lead to false results. The reason is that the creed is far beyond the mental powers of children, and if a child is taught it, the child will reason on it, the chances are that his or her immature mind will

form wrong ideas that in after-life will be hard to iradicate ; let me take a few illustrations from the creed itself.

"We witness," say Al-Gazali, "that He is not a body possessing bounds and limits.....Measure does not bound Him and boundaries do not contain Him ; the directions do not surround Him and neither the earth nor the heavens are on diffrent sides of Him."

"He does not exist in anything, just as nothing exist in Him."

"Nay, He was before He had created Time and Place and He is now above that which He was above."

Now I ask the question seriously, is it possible, do you think, for any child to understand the above ? I leave you to answer, all I will say is that if the child did exist who understood it or if the child does exist who understands it that child had or has an intelligence superior to mine. When a person talks to me about :—

"He does not exist in anything, just as nothing exists in Him."
or

"He is now above that which He was above," I am always inclined to tell that person that he is talking nonsense, namely, he is using language that has no meaning. He is what people generally call arguing in a circle.

It must be recognised in this connection that there is a great difference between a statement that you cannot understand in the ordinary sense of the term and one that you can't understand, because it is either self-contradictory or because it is meaningless. A scientist or a philosopher may write something you do not understand because you are not acquainted with the details or data of the subject under, review, the same writers may make a statement or statements that you can at once pronounce as self-contradictory or as absurd. To say as Al-Gazali says, that,— "He exists in nothing, just as nothing exists in Him ;" is equal to saying He does not exist while at the same time he is trying to prove His existence. Here we have a self-contradiction, he actually denies what he is attempt-

ing to affirm. Again, to say "He is now above what He was above," is simply asserting that He is where He was, which is, so far as his argument is concerned, meaningless.

J. M. Robertson has a few remarks in his *Letters on Reasoning* which are worth careful study and which I here briefly sum up :—

1. Malice is very apt to make us misread an opponent's meaning.

2. One is very apt to mistake an argument one does not like. A proportion that jars on our feelings spontaneously takes for us a more repulsive form, such a tendency is hard to guard against. (I have here only given the meaning not the actual words of the text) still I will lay down a few prescriptions, some of which might be useful.

(1) In such matters we ought to ask ourselves, as it were by rule, whether we are doing as we would be done by.

(2) Even if we are, so to speak, in a "state of war" with any writer or disputant, and feel that he ought to be discredited, a patient analysis of his argument is the best preparation for an effective reply. If he is quite wrong, we shall realise this more fully and clearly after repeated reflection ; if he is not quite wrong we are much likelier when patient to guard against indiscriminate or blundering denial of what he says. The clearest perception, as a rule, will always yield the truest and most clear-cut rebuttal.

(3) Make it a point, if possible, to argue against yourself before, you undertake to maintain any position. That is, try to conceive at every step how an opponent might answer you.

But with all this remember, it is of supreme and constant importance to *know* the subject under discussion many if not most errors result from imperfect or false information, or prejudice, rather than from wrong processes of reasoning on facts, it follows that improvement depends very much on further search for facts.

Possibly by this time some of you may have come to the conclusion that it is a hard thing to reason consistently and harder still to act, and, such being the case, it is not worth while attempting it, perhaps you may also be inclined to argue that if Haeckel and Kant in the West and Al-Gazali and Ibn Sina in the East could not reason consistently there is no use your trying it. To stop reasoning you must stop thinking, so long as you think you must reason. All our acts have a certain purpose in view, and that purpose is the result of reasoning, our very existence depends on our reasoning as correctly as possible. We have to choose food that will suit our digestive organs and give us the nourishment we require. The safety of the individual and the safety of the state depend on correct reasoning and on it depends the morality and progress of humanity ; to be a good reasoner is as incumbent on us as to be a good citizen. The better reasoner you are the better citizen you will be and the more service you will be able to give the state. By bad reasoning we gain nothing and we may lose much, by good reasoning we lose nothing and we may gain much. Now be careful what construction you put on the terms "bad" and "good" reasoner, do not be led to the conclusion there are two kinds of reason, there is only one, it differs in individuals only in degree, not kind. A "good" reasoner is one who does not contradict himself in the course of an argument while a "bad" reasoner takes up contradictory positions ; yet they both reason. The ideal, therefore, of all reasoning is consistency, and it is our duty to follow the ideal and attempt to realize it, remembering that inconsistency is generally caused by a want of knowledge of the facts.

PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM.

ONE of the most difficult things in this world is for a person to make himself understood, more especially in the higher and wider generalisations that lead to world conception. In my previous article I dealt with the errors that arise through a looseness of language, the indefiniteness, vagueness and ambiguity of word meanings in general usage in the criticism of philosophical problems, and as an example of how the question stands at present, I dealt with the word "Intelligence" and attempted to find a method whereby we could counteract if not overcome the difficulty of language. It will therefore be understood that in this and any other article that may follow, the method therein shown is the method that will be pursued in the analysis of all philosophical problems. This method of reasoning or criticism is not something mysterious, it is simply the same method of thinking, of reasoning, in general use in everyday life and applied by us continually to our acts and known familiarly as common sense. Only it is that common sense more highly trained and made use of in an organised and methodical manner; so as to eliminate as far as possible the chance of error. To maintain consistency in reasoning ought to be the aim of every person, the philosopher equally with the mechanic. Philosophy is not some high-sounding medley of words or mixture of ideas, but it is clearness of thought, simplicity of statement and correctness of deduction.

Time was when Islam had a philosophy, in fact, when she taught philosophy to the nations of the earth and held as in thrall the learned of the world. For a period her master-minds drank deep of the stream of knowledge, and bathed in the rivers of thought; but a reaction set in; sense had become lost in the mists of ambiguous language. Al Ghazali arose and the ship of philosophy went down in the ocean of mysticism; the flag of truth entangled amid her rigging and her spars. In the Middle Ages the process seemed to be either to accept the whole of the teachings of a philosopher or to reject them entirely; it never seemed

to strike people that a man might be partly right and partly wrong, that some of his teachings might be true and others untrue.

So when Al Ghazali smote the philosopher's hip and thigh even as Israel smote the troops of Moab and Ammon; there was no attempt to differentiate between truth and falsehood, they both went out together into the valley of the shadow of Death, the good and the true side by side with the evil and the false. No doubt, there was a vast accumulation of the false, but there was also something substantial. Al Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina and other philosophers had evolved systems that no mind on earth might make head or tails of or contemplate with serenity; the greater part of their attempt at a solution of the world-riddle was sheer absurdity and not understandable, and gives an illustration of the fact that what seems to one man clear as day may to another appear as a hopeless tangle of words. But in saying this we must remember that nineteenth century science had not evolved and we must give the old Muslim philosophers credit for what they did accomplish. They at least were on the right path, the road that led to the goal and to a solution of the problem; they were building upon the data supplied them by experience and taking their stand upon facts. When Al Ghazali came facts were swept overboard and the hand of progress moved backward upon the dial of thought and, from the realms of reality mind was translated into the region of Ontology, and mysticism and ecstasy, and the imagination triumphed over reason and facts.

Not that there is no truth in the opinions held by mystics or in those taught by Al Ghazali; for there is truth, but only in so far as they have been confirmed by all experience and drawn from the bed-rock of objectivity. Subjectivity in itself can never tell us anything concerning reality. Everything we know has been taught us by experience, all knowledge possessed by the human race has been drawn from that source.

Revelation is part and parcel of experience and it is to be obtained only through the ordinary methods of investigation. To turn to subjectivity only for explanation and to reject objectivity is to cast reason to the winds and attempt to build knowledge on a dream.

Subjectivity and objectivity are inseparable in reality ; they are two aspects of reality abstracted by us in thought. To attain to positive knowledge we must take our stand on facts and from them attempt to work out a world-conception that will arrange and explain phenomena and serve us as a means of orientation in this world, as a law for the regulation of our conduct. When Al Ghazali took away the slender pedestal that philosophy was at that time resting on and introduced mysticism in place of investigation and reliance on subjectivity as opposed to objectivity as illusion ; he not only took away the only means of mental progress but he directed thought into a veritable *cul de sac* that led simply to world-flight and pessimism. This does not of course infer that he was all wrong and that the philosophers were all right ; there was much truth and more error on both sides, but while their system was in the end bound to lead to exact observation and scientific method his system led only to contemplation and inertia, the one was the broad road to mind emancipation and the other the narrow path to mental decadence. Subjectivity and objectivity are not the same, but they are indivisible being separated only in thought ; aspects of a whole ; there is no subjectivity without objectivity nor no objectivity without subjectivity. To us objectivity appears as matter moving in space and obviously other subjects appear to us as objects, while we ourselves as subject appear to others as object, the spiritual and material are inseparable. Objectivity is the only means by which we can attain to an explanation of reality. Errors are children of the mind, they exist only in mentality ; there are no errors in nature : in the realm of objective facts ; but errors may creep in in our description of facts and principally in our representations of the relations and meanings of facts, sensations or sense-impressions are correct, but our reading of them may be wrong as Dr. Paul Carus says :—"Subjectivity is the condition of the soul, but subjectivity does not constitute its character. The character of a man's thoughts and sentiments has been stamped upon his sentiency by sense-impressions that come from the outside, all of which though extremely variegated and individual bear the traces of an uniformity that pervades the objective world. The uniformities of

nature, as the very word indicates, are regularities of form, and it is the perception of the regularities of form which in the course of evolution comes to constitute man's rationality."

Philosophy cannot be destroyed, philosophy is necessary to religion and the man who attempts to destroy it is not only attempting a futile but a foolish thing. While science is not only a description of facts, a search for truth, a methodical search for truth: Philosophy is the search for what may be termed the higher truths, the uniformities on which man's conduct is based, it is the science of sciences; the methodical arrangement of total experience, the generalisation of the world-order in laws of universal application and validity which go by the name of ethics. While philosophy is the search for and formulation of those laws in sentient symbols; religion is the enthusiasm for and application of those laws of whose truth we are convinced to practical life; and the value of our religion depends therefore on the correctness of our knowledge on the truth of our philosophy.

Religion therefore in its higher and nobler ideals always has been and always will be effected by philosophy; in its general application, as applied by the intelligence of the ordinary individual, it is simply the acting up to ethical rules learned in boyhood and taught by the prophets and teachers of the race who had themselves deduced them from experience and recognised their universal validity. The method of mysticism is what has come to be known in the west as ontology; the method of starting from abstract ideas and from them trying to explain the universe, it is the attempt to explain existence from non-existence and to bridge over the gap between nothingness and something. Some of the greatest philosophers and thinkers in the world have from this system felt confident of constructing a universe out of pure thought and deducing existence from reason. But the thing was impossible, and one sentence of Kant's shattered into pieces the whole fabric of ontological speculation and brought it tumbling about the ears of its advocates until they were buried in the ruins. that sentence was:—

"All knowledge *a priori* is empty and cannot give information about things."

AL-FARABI.

ABU NASR IBN MAHOMED IBN TARKHAN IBN UZLAG AL-FARABI was a philosopher whose system had a predominating effect on Islamic thought; like all other systems of that time, it drew its inspiration either from the writings of Aristotle or from works then attributed to him, like all philosophies of that period, it contained a good deal of error but also an underlying stratum of truth, correct and valuable for all time. Owing to the medley of ideas and ambiguity of language it is at all times difficult to extract the gold from the dross. You begin to get lost in innumerable grades of spirits and bodies which, although there is a certain value in the method of arrangement, is so mixed up with fallacious reasoning that it has a tendency to impress one as being sheer nonsense.

When he divides reality into the incorporeal and the corporeal he is doing what scientists do to-day—adopting the classification of the spiritual and the material; and his further division into grades is still an extension of scientific method, where he fails is in the results of his classification, he arranges ideas in grades where gradation is an absurdity, he attempts to draw a line of demarcation where no such line is possible where the ideas represented belong to different series.

In his Incorporeal division his first three grades are "God," "The Spirits of the Spheres," and the "Active Reason" they form pure spirit. Now the spiritual cannot by any means be divided after this fashion. The term spiritual applies to the representative value of feelings and if we divide it at all we divide more naturally into soul, mind and spirit, but these divisions are not grades one rising above the other, they are simply, series within a series, otherwise three aspects or generalisations within a total series where the generalisations are not continuations but abstracts coexistent; and representing certain features only of the whole. None of these come under the above grades of Al-Farabi unless by Active Reason he means

thought-operations which we generally understand by the term mind. Reason itself is an attribute of the spiritual, or of the soul, which I have defined in my previous article on Intelligence. The "Spirits of the Spheres" have no existence, in fact they are only products of Al-Farabi's or somebody else's imagination. Even the term "God" cannot be graded as part of the spiritual unless we revise our ideas of words and language in general. The idea of God is an abstract representing certain features of reality. The idea of God therefore is abstract thought, but God himself is a reality. Different minds place different meanings on the "idea or abstract of God" which may be summed up under the following divisions, at least approximately in general terms :—

Theism, the belief, without any qualification, that God, whatever be his nature, exists.

Atheism, the view that rejects any conception of God.

Polytheism, the belief in many Gods.

Monotheism, the belief that there is but one God

Anthropotheism, the belief that God is a personal being like man.

Pantheism, the belief that identifies the All with God.

Entheism, the view that regards God as inseparable from the world. He is eternal in nature.

Cosmotheism, the view which regards the cosmic order as God.

Nomothetism, the view which recognises God in the uniformities of nature.

To discuss all these points would require an article to itself, and it is not here necessary, but we may sum up in the words of Carus : "God is the indestructible *Sursum* which ensouls everything that exists, which constitutes the direction of evolution and the growth of life, which is the truth in the empire of spiritual existence. It is an actuality no less than Matter and Energy, and, indeed, like these two, which represents as it were God's reality as well as his power and omnipotence, it cannot be lost in all the changes that take place in the constant formation of solar systems. It is eternal, and it is in him we live and move and have

our being," otherwise God is the eternal and uniform in reality, the norm of all existence and the basis of morality in the ordinary conception he is personified truth and justice. The God of entheism, cosmotheism and Nomotheism "the formative factor which moulds worlds, which fashions all beings, which has created our soul, and which moves onward in the progress of evolution."

The next three grades are,—“Soul, Form and Matter which, although incorporeal, enter into relation with body. Soul, as already pointed out is an abstract of certain features of the spiritual. While form might be justly described as the spiritual and be conveniently divided into the Rigidly Formal (such as Logic and Arithmetic), Purely Formal (such as Mathematics, etc.,) and Empirically Formal (such as the forms of things), the latter is possibly the basis of Al-Farabi's matter. It is scarcely worth while discussing his grades of the corporeal world, the divisions are merely arbitrary and have been rendered effete by the surer and more accurate method of modern science. Farabi's position was, that purity of soul was the condition and fruit of all philosophizing, and that judgment has to be trained by geometry and logic. This of course is a concise statement of the matter, but it does not go to the root and gives no explanation of the process, the aim of all philosophy is without doubt a correct world-conception, and the judgment is trained by logic and arithmetic, but how do they come to train it? In other words, are the laws of reasoning *a priori* or *a posteriori*? this question can be answered, has been answered, but Al-Farabi does not touch it, or, if its solution *a priori* is to be deduced from his writings and his mysticism it is a false one, and yet he is correct in assuming that philosophy is the one all-embracing science which pictures the world to us as a Universe. As De Boer says:—

“Among ideas Farabi recognises here the simplest psychological forms, that is, both the representations of individual objects arising from *sense-perception* and those ideas which have been stamped upon the mind from the first, such as the necessary, the actual, the possible, such representations and ideas are immediately certain. By combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these may be either true or false.”

Here Al-Farabi is either not clear in his utterance or his expounder is not clear, but it seems evident from the words I have placed in italics that he looked upon some ideas as existing *a priori* in the mind itself. It may be stated, and that emphatically, that no "ideas" exist *a priori*. Many another philosopher has gone astray on this point as well as Al-Farabi. They saw that ideas developed in a systematic manner; that Reason was not incoherent, that it was methodical, and that its method could be reduced to laws or uniformities under the name of Logic, but they were unable to understand why this was so and they came to look upon it as an insoluble mystery, something that existed *a priori*. What they failed to see was, that the universe is a cosmos not a chaos; and that man is part of the cosmos. The same order therefore appears in man's mind as appears in the cosmos as a whole, and this order in the mind we term Pure Reason as differentiated from Human Reason which is only correct in so far as it conforms to Pure Reason or the World-Reason. This pure Reason is not composed of "Ideas" it is the uniformities or order that appears not only in objectivity but in subjectivity; it is not *a priori* neither is there any mystery about it. It is unnecessary to postulate, the Necessary, the Actual, and the Possible. Reality exists and that is All can be said. The why and wherefore are illegitimate questions: they are of no value. When you have cognised a thing you have postulated its existence. Existence is simply the statement of the self-evident fact that existence exists: to predicate a thing and then to assume that it is non-existent is a contradiction in thought. All knowledge is a description of facts, Reality therefore implies not only existence but the manifestation of existence; still existence and its manifestation are inseparable, they are one. If it is considered necessary to answer the question of the why and wherefore of existence the answer is formulated in the law of the conservation of Matter and Energy (*i.e.*, substance) matter and energy are indestructible and uncreatable, they are eternal; in other words, they exist, have existed, and will continue to exist. And yet, if De Boer is right Al-Farabi was, in spite of these definitions of his, able to see that "the existence of a thing is nothing but the thing itself," as I have already said existence and manifestation are one. In some of his

statements it would seem as if he had a vague and indistinct view of the correct solution ; he seemed to see the truth as it were but to state it wrong. For instance, the statement that, "the Logical order of the world is at the same time a moral order," would be correct if it were made to read,—“Man's conformity to the order of the world is morality.” Again,—“The life of the soul is raised from things of sense to thought, by means of the power of Representation.” The soul is the product of the whole organisation, the above would ring truer if it read—“Soul life has its base in sensation, and developes by means of Representation *plus* preservation of form, *i.e.*, memory.” Al-Farabi saw things as “through a glass, darkly.” To him “Experience takes in only the forms which have been extracted from the world of Matter” yet “it is only by means of their (the pure spirits of the spheres) influence that his actual experience becomes explicable to him.” If the influence of the spirits of the spheres (supposing they had an existence) is not experience? What it is ; echo answers What ? Let us now turn to Ibn Sina and see if it is possible to analyse his system as given by De Boer so as to separate some of the gold from the dross.

IBN SINA.

ABU ALI AL-HUSAIN IBN ABDULLAH IBN SINA is known in Asia as *the Shaikh par excellence*, while Ibn Khallikhan speaks of him as "the chief (of philosophers) Abu Ali Ibn Sina," Ameer Ali, Syed says:—"He was unquestionably the master spirit of his age, and in spite of the opposition raised against him by fanaticism and self-interest, he left his impress in undying characters on the thoughts of succeeding ages." Al Ghazali, writing of the philosophers Farabi and Ibn Sina, says;—"Their philosophy is so confused that you cannot separate the truth from false, so as to refute the latter." There is a great deal of truth in this sentence, the numerous grades, forms and spirits and the vagueness of their relationship renders the whole system a confused medley of words; as De Boer points out "there is a want of clearness in his (Ibn Sina's) views regarding the relation of the forms of existence, Spirit and Body, Form and Matter, Substance and Accident." But in saying this we must remember that such a feature was common to the philosophy of the period; truth only emerges by degrees as experience becomes enriched with the accumulated investigation of the generations of the ages.

Again, the philosophy of Islam, although not Greek, drew its basic or first ideas from the Greeks at the head of whom, in their estimation, stood Aristotle. Now, Aristotle himself inculcated a number of errors especially in regard to causation, a true conception of which is the basis of philosophical thought.

No doubt Farabi taught the love of Truth even though it should oppose Aristotle, but this appeal had after all little effect in causing the philosophers of Islam to verify by an appeal to facts the results of their reasoning, in other words, they philosophised simply, without investigating for the purpose of methodically arranging phenomena. In the system of Ibn Sina "philosophy proper is divided into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. In its entirety it embraces the science of all existence as such and of the principals of all the separate sciences, whereby,

as far as is humanly possible, the soul which is devoted to philosophy attains the highest perfection." I cannot see the value of dividing philosophy into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. If, as he maintains, it embraces the sciences of all existence, namely, is the science of the sciences; it surveys not only the above mentioned, but all branches of investigation and, more especially the science of life which, I take to include the social sciences as well as the natural sciences.

According to him Existence is either spiritual, when it is the subject of Metaphysics, or coporeal (material) when it is discussed in physics. The subject of physics cannot be thought of without matter. The spiritual is quite devoid of Matter. As I have already pointed out, the Spiritual and the Material are two abstracts deduced by us from Reality and do not exist of themselves. No doubt the spiritual is quite devoid of Matter in the sense that it is not material.

But no one has ever seen a man's thoughts or mental-operations walking or flying about the street independent of the man. It is not possible to conceive of anything existing apart from Matter. Matter and Force without Form, Force and Form without Matter, or Matter without either Force and Form are absurdities. How hard it is for even the greatest minds to be consistent in their reasoning. To Ibn Sina, Body and Soul have no essential connection; from the active spirit over us, every Body receives its own soul, which is adapted to it and to it alone. This position had been already overthrown by Al-Farabi when he said "that mind or spirit was present in the soul of the child as a capability or potentiality, and it becomes actual spirit in the course of its apprehension of bodily forms in experience by means of the senses and the representative faculty." In fact the soul develops according to the biogenetic law and is part and parcel of the evolutionary process. The Logical is, according to Ibn Sina, an abstraction from the Material and has a certain likeness to the Mathematical, but the reason of that likeness he fails to grasp. The Logical is bound to have a likeness to the Mathematical as he himself asserts "Logic is the science of the Determinate Forms of thought." Such being the case, the Mathematical is the representation in

symbols of combinations constructed by pure thought alone which is and must be logical so long as it deals with the combination and separation of thought operations only as in Arithmetic it then belongs to what Carus calls the rigidly formal, but all branches of mathematics are not rigidly formal, some are purely formal such as Geometry.

"A struggle with sense is required in order that the life of representation may be elevated to the pure truth of Reason, through which any knowledge of a necessary kind is gained. The divinely-inspired man, but he alone, can dispense with Logic, precisely as the Bedouin is independent of an Arabic Grammar,"

I take it that the struggle of sense referred to is, the struggle of ideas that takes place, not only in the mind of the individual but in the world of thought. I am not inclined to speak of knowledge of a "necessary" kind, this is practically the result attained by Utilitarians, but science guarded by strict criticism attains to knowledge that is positive in its result. The divinely-inspired man does not dispense with Logic, he is more logical than others in his special field whatever it may be, for we cannot confine the term inspiration to the field of Ethics alone. The man who dispenses with Logic will be inconsistent in his reasoning and his inconsistencies will be apparent and will soon be thrown overboard. The Bedouin is not independent of Grammar; language is part of the evolutionary process. It is gradually formed. Grammar is the analysis of the uniformities of the evolved language at a certain stage of its growth, the deduction of fixed rules and the logical application of these rules to further additions to the written form: it might be termed the change from a natural (from a system that has developed by natural growth) to a system of art (a system controlled by definite rules.)

"Matter is the eternal and pure possibility of all that exists."

This statement is contradictory to his position that the "Spiritual is quite devoid of matter" and also that "Body and soul have no essential connection with each other" matter is only an abstract deduced by us from reality

for economy in thought and the purpose of comprehending phenomena. Matter is therefore a generalisation of the qualities of things as referable to mass and volume.

"The world could not be more beautiful nor better than it really is."

This is the old error that crops up so often in controversies on the freedom or non-freedom of the will. It is the mistake of applying a term of relative mode to a total or "absolute" series. It is logical and legitimate to say that one man is more intelligent, than another, or that one star is larger than another, but it is absurd to say that all men are intelligent or that all stars are large.

You may say that one feature of the universe is more beautiful than another, or one principle, or theory is better than another, but to assert that all features of the universe in their totality are beautiful, or ugly, or that all principles are good, or bad, is a violation of language and lands us in sheer absurdity.

"The sudden rise and disappearance of substance (Creation and annihilation) in contrast to the constant movement, that is, the gradual passing of the possible into the actual—seem to Ibn Sina to indicate nothing impossible."

We shall come to this point when we deal with Al-Ghazali's views on cause and effect and may leave it meantime. Ibn Sina's theory of forms is of no value in our present outlook, it was completely overthrown by Al-Ghazali, and deservedly so. While his theories of the Five Internal senses need not trouble us at present. We now pass on to Al-Ghazali.

AL-GAZALI.

WE now come to deal with one of the greatest thinkers, not only in Islam but in the world of thought. This he remains, no matter whether we agree with the results he arrived at or not. An outstanding and striking personality he impresses us with the brilliance of his character and his enthusiasm; the extraordinary grasp of intellect that dealt with every branch of thought, the patience with which he devoted himself to the elucidation of Truth. His failure to attain a correct world-conception was more the effect of his environment—of the time—than want of ability. There was a want of coherence in the data with which he dealt, not that there was no attempt at method; as we have seen, there was a system of classification; a division into grades all connected in a continuous series. But the classification was incorrect, it was only a crude approximation as all attempts at a first classification of certain features of reality must be. Facts and ideas were arranged but they were sometimes stored in the wrong box along with others not belonging to the same series. Al-Gazali made no attempt to revise the classification or to go to nature itself for the data on which to work; he simply dealt with the material as presented to him by his predecessors such as Farabi, Ibn Sina and Aristotle. Had he, like Al-Beruni and Ibn Haitham, dealt with the material of the natural sciences it is possible he would, like them, have evolved a system more methodical in its application, and more positive in its results. His special work, unfortunately for Islam, lay in other fields where for centuries the effects of his teachings crippled development and retarded progress.

We do not require to enter here into the whole system of Al-Gazali; only his attitude towards philosophy and in so far as that attitude was philosophical and reveals to us his world-conception.

According to Macdonald and De Boer, the three fundamental points on which he attacks the philosophers are—

First.—They reject the resurrection of the body, physical punishment hereafter; the punishment

of the next world will be spiritual only. That there will be spiritual punishments Al-Gazali admits, but there will be physical as well.

Second.—They hold that God knows universals only, not particulars.

Third.—They hold that the world exists from all eternity and to all eternity.

Part of these doctrines must be stamped as unbelief, part as heresy, and part as theologically indifferent. When doctrines are put before you the point to be decided is, are they true; doctrines are either true or untrue, they cannot be classed as either heretical or as indifferent; if they are untrue they are of no value and must be thrown aside, if they are true they must be accepted; this solution never occurred to him, he stamps dogmatically all as unbelief, that is opposed to his own beliefs without seeing that what he condemns are beliefs—the belief of others—and that they are equally as justified in calling his opinion as opposed to theirs unbelief; such a method cuts both ways and proves nothing.

In a short article such as this I can only attempt to meet a few of the most important points, and that too as briefly as possible. When we look at nature in all its aspects we find a vast panorama of phenomena.

Change, ceaseless change taking place every where.

Every thing seems to be transient in its existence; some bodies having a longer duration of existence than others, yet even they are undergoing a slow continual transformation. In both the spiritual and material, creation and dissolution; as this eternal process presents itself to us; this creation and destruction of form: this rising and falling of nations; this surge of ideas; this birth and growth and decay and death, of men and states, this pain and pleasure, joy and sorrow of the human race; we are led to exclaim with the Buddha:—

“ Is there no permanency then,
No realm of rest were troubles cease
Where birth is not, nor death of men
No kingdom of eternal peace.”

This transiency gave to phenomena the appearance of illusion and from this idea sprang the philosophy of mysticism, having for its principal dreams and its base ecstasy with its tendency to renunciation and asceticism, the Real was hidden from our eyes by a veil ; it was not in phenomena but beyond phenomena ; the senses were deceptive and the universe a mere juggling trick. Prof. James, the famous American Psychologist and defender of Pragmatism, writes to the effect that, "All religious feeling has its rise in mystical states of consciousness." If this were so all Religion would be a dream, a castle in the air, an airy nothing built upon nothingness, that before the advancement of science would dissolve away like a house whose foundations had been laid upon a bed of sand. No, we must build upon the solid facts of reality ; upon a bed rock whose foundations are eternal. The sense of mystery is not a necessary element in the life of humanity, the grandeur of the world is not mysterious, neither are its problems solved or revealed by "mystical states of consciousness." True holiness is to be found only in clearness of thought, and the application of the truths arrived at to practical life. We may go on building ideals but they will have no value unless they agree with objectivity. If we found our ideals not on reality but on ecstasy and visions we are founding on subjectivity, and such ideals are but dreams. The pursuit of the ideal is not a myth, it is a fact of our soul-life and one of the principle facts on which progress depends, the pursuit of the Ideal has given to humanity the majority of its noblest individuals, the grandest of its deeds, the highest of its aspirations, the holiest of its virtues and the best of its heroism. A man's ideal is the predominant note of his character, it is his personality ; and its realisation is the highest summit to which his soul can rise. There are no doubt ideals and deals, but as a distinguished writer has said, "The genuine ideal is a dream that genius shapes out of reality." Our senses do not deceive us as Al-Gazali thought ; our senses convey to us only the movements received from objectivity which in the *aethetal* cells of the brain appear as feelings, telling us that such and such a body, so formed, so moving, exists towards the spot from which the impress seems to come. Out of these simple elements our conscience has arisen.

In our thought-operations we compare the various impressions with each other, arrange them methodically in series, and attempt to ascertain and explain their relations to each other and to the whole. The sense-impressions do not deceive us. They are correct and they are real ; but our arrangement of them may be wrong, and our explanation of their relations may be false. Our ideas therefore will only be correct, insofar as they agree with the facts from which they are deduced. It does not matter whether we call facts realities or illusions, they are the data on which our ideas rest, from which our soul has developed and they are the only data from which we can construct a true conception of the universe and solve the problems of mentality, no matter what we may call them, facts are to us realities they are facts, they are the specie which our concepts, generalisations and ideals represent, just as a paper-note represents a certain quantity of gold. True or correct ideas may be likened to bills for which gold can be obtained, they agree with facts, while incorrect ideas represent bills for which there is no money in the bank. They do not agree with the facts. The question of the eternity of the World is one of the problems that people have been to ready too declare insolvable. No problem is *per se* insolvable, a problem that cannot be solved is an absurdity and is generally resolvable into a contradiction of terms. We can best attack this problem as it presents itself to us in Islamic philosophy by analysing Al-Gazali's position in regard to cause and effect. Macdonald says :—

“ Seven hundred years before Hume, he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause or effect but simply that one thing follows another.....when he has finished there is no intellectual bases left for life ; he stands beside the Greek sceptics and beside Hume.”

De Boer puts the position as follows :—

“ We see one definite phenomenon (cause) regularly succeeded by another definite phenomenon (effect); but how the latter results from the former is left an enigma for us. Of operation in the objects of nature we know nothing further, any alteration is in itself inconceivable.

That any one thing should become a different thing is incomprehensible to thought, which may just as well ask about facts as about causes."

Macdonald possibly following Renan who follows Degen-erando places Al-Gazali beside Hume, but as Robertson has pointed out in a note in his *History of Free Thought* their positions are quite different. Al-Gazali's is that of theism Hume's that of naturalism. If the position of Al-Gazali is correct, that cause and effect is an insolvable enigma and that we can know nothing of the operations of the objects of nature; the situation is a serious one. Our every action, our very thoughts, our mental activity in all its aspects—the whole superstructure of the sciences, and art in all its bearings—are based upon the rigidity of the law of causation. If facts are simply individual entities without any connection; science is a fraud and knowledge is a nightmare; while civilization as a result of continual progress in investigation is an impossibility.

In dealing with cause and effect we return, as in the majority of philosophical problems, to the old difficulty, a definition of words. What do we mean by cause and effect? Unless we solve this question for ourselves we shall never be able to understand or solve the problems of philosophy and ethics. I shall not here enter into the discussion of accidents and substance; to do so would be simply to attempt to reconcile it which the modern theories of atoms, or with that or Electrons and Ions. Scientific investigation has shown that all bodies or matter is constructed out of certain definite substances called elements; such as Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, Iron, etc. (whether these elements can be again subdivided into simpler constituents does not here concern us). Every "thing" is therefore composed of a certain quantity and a certain quality of those elements-of matter, and it appears in a certain Form, and its appearance is due to motion. As I have already said, matter, force, and form are abstracts representing certain features of existence and in reality are inseparable, they always exist together. Bodies or things are therefore combinations built up of simpler elements, they are compounds, and the elements of which they are composed are in continual motion, the bodies are

undergoing a gradual transformation, the elements of which they are built are constant, there is a continual change of form, the transformation of a definite amount of matter and energy without any increase or decrease of substance. From this scientists have deduced what are known as the laws of the "Conservation of Matter" and the "Conservation of Energy" and both have been united as the "Law of Substance." If you burn a peice of wood, you have not destroyed the material of which it was composed, you have simply set in motion a definite amount of energy and by a process of transformation resolved the wood into simpler elements; you have created a new form or forms from a another form. All the processes in nature are similar, though some are more complex than others, a gradual and continuous transition of form from one form of matter to another form of matter, from one form of energy to another form of energy. This process has been called causation. But causation is not to be looked on as simply a chain of events; Reality is a system of interactions, and causation or the law of causation a statement of the uniformity, rigidness and universality of the process. The same conditions will everywhere produce the same results. Nowhere has science yet found a "thing" that could be proved not to be the result of transformation. With this explanation we now return to our problem. A cause is something that produces an effect; an effect is the result of a cause or causes. There is no cause without an effect nor an effect without a cause. Everything has a special from and is in a special place; but whatever its nature it is the result of events. These events which produce, "Create" or form and mould things are called their "causes," after the effect has been produced the cause may be said to disappear, it is translated as it were into the effect which in turn becomes the cause of another effect in process of accomplishment. Causes are those events which by their *motion* produce effects. Every cause is therefore a motion; it is in a certain place and at a certain time, it is a single fact. All through philosophy we find a confusion between cause and reasons, we cannot here discuss the difference in detail but we may define Reasons as :—

- (1) General ideas expressing qualities of things.

- (2) Universal rules concerning the nature of such qualifications.
- (3) Natural Laws applicable wherever and whenever things are possessed of these qualities.

(see *Carus, Primer of philosophy, p. 139*).

Reasons are not causes they are the *why* things act as they do, Reasons are always explanations. If I have a stone in my hand and let it go, it will fall to the ground. The cause of the stone's fall would be my letting it go; but the Reason of its fall would be the quality or nature of the stone. All bodies possessing mass and volume: i.e. weight and bulk, attract each other; and this inherent quality or nature of bodies we call gravity, it has been found to vary inversely to the square of the distance; and this formula or uniformity; expressing the nature of the quality, we call the law of Gravitation. We hear often of first causes; final causes and effective causes. Those terms are meaningless; relative terms cannot be logically applied to a total series in the chain of causation. If one cause is first or final all causes are first or final. To speak of an effective cause is to go still further into the mire. All causes are effective; a cause that has no effect is no cause at all. It will now be evident (at least I hope it is) from what has been said that there is nothing mysterious, there is no enigma about cause and effect. To say that we know nothing of cause and effect, but only that one thing follows another is a misstatement of the case. We have seen that causation is a transformation; and all transformations are successions of events which are inter-related; we can observe transformations. The business of science is to observe, to describe, explain and apply. We make observations of similar and different kinds and describe them so that the determining factors are brought into relief. When we can trace all the changes so that the details of the process are recognised as transformations the explanation is complete. The law of causation which is a law of motion describes transformations which take place, and in which the quantity of matter and energy remain constant, the form only is changed. When we observe a process in which the effect produced can be traced through

a series of transformations to its cause or the predominating factor in its production we are satisfied. We now see what effect our investigation has on the question "is the world eternal." Matter and Force (or better energy) remain constant, there is no addition, no subtraction of quantity they are uncreatable and indestructible, there is only a continuous creation and destruction of form. Experience therefore leads to the conclusion that substance (Matter & Force) has existed, does exist and will continue to exist. A close examination of the investigation will also show us that we have here a solution of the problem of the Resurrection of the body. Our body is a compound of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and other elements and it appears in a special form, and like all other forms it is subject to transformation; the transformation most easily followed is that of birth, growth decay and death. But during this period there is a still more subtle transformation going on. Man is a multicellular animal, he is built of numerous protoplasmic cells all united in what may be termed a co-operative society; and each individual cell may be looked upon as a separate organism; and like every member of a human colony every cell has a certain labor to perform, its own special work to do. As those cells get broken down by the wear and tear of our activity, the elemental atoms of which they are composed are being continuously replaced by new ones. The food we eat goes to replace the waste matter of the tissues. When we breathe we throw out waste material in the form of carbonic acid, and take in fresh oxygen to invigorate and rebuild the system. It has been estimated; that this process completely rebuilds the body every seven years. Every seven years therefore we have a new body as it were, composed of different atoms, but practically retaining the same empirical form. The material given off goes again to form part of the structure of the world. The atoms that are at one time part of my body or your body may at another period of their existence form part of the body substance of other organisms or enter into the constituents of stream or cloud. It is at death that the most rapid change of form takes place, the whole structure is broken up into its constituent elements which are scattered through space, hither and thither, entering now into the

composition of one thing and now into the structure of that. There is a good deal of truth in the words of old Omar when he says :—

“ I sometimes think that never blows so red
The rose, as where some buried Caesar bled
And every Hyacinth the garden wears
Dropt in her lap from some once lovely head.”

I am also reminded of another a verse of Umar's ; it runs as follows :—

“And when like her, *Oh Saki* you shall pass
Among the guest's star,—scatter'd on the grass,
And in your joyous errand reach the spot
Where I made one turn down on empty Glass.”

It is plainly evident from experience that there can be no resurrection of the body as it was at any period of individual existence or at death; for the body itself is ever-changing and when activity ceases the atoms go to form part of the soil in which it is buried and, in the never-ending process of causation, to be driven from form to form—“Scatter'd on the grass.” To resurrect the human body as it was at any period of its existence you would require to resurrect the Universe.

Yet I trust that when you and I in our “joyous errand reach the spot”, we will not “turn down an empty glass.” We have received a noble heritage of spiritual possibilities; the realm of experience hedges us on every side; problem after problem confronts us and these we solve, moving ever onward from point to point; one problem solved another is attacked; so progress is continuous and nobler ideals develop, and we go ever forward from the known into the unknown, and the horizon widens before us and the unknown becomes the known; and still humanity goes onward; and still the unknown becomes the known. Even as the horizon recedes before a ship sailing on a waste of waters so does the unknown recede before the known, for, as man has solved the problems presented to him in the past, so will he solve the problems of the present and the future. The idea that the universe is a

fortuitous concourse of atoms or accidents will not stand the test of scientific analysis. The universe is a cosmos not a chaos; things are possessed of certain qualities and act of necessity according to those qualities; things are conditioned by their environment; things are such because of their form. Uniformity is the order of nature, and its regularity is the basis, not the result of intelligence; wherever things are possessed of the same qualities they will act in the same way; the same result will be produced by the same conditions.

"Necessity is the inevitable determinedness of events by the nature of the things in action."

"The law of gravitation is not the power which compels the stone to fall; it is a formula which describes in a comprehensive way the action of gravitating bodies. The gravity which makes a stone fall is an intrinsic quality of the stone. The stone while falling is not obedient to any law outside of it, but acts according to its nature." (*P. Carus, Primer of Philosophy, p. 164*).

One of the most curious points of Al-Ghazali's philosophy is the prominence given to Will.

"It is not thought which impresses him, but volitions, From thought he can develop nothing; from will can come the whole round universe."

Here again we are landed in the tangle of terminology. What is the meaning of will? Will must be a wonderful thing if it can produce the universe and, what produced it? The term Will has been used in connection with self-motion, the spontaneous motions of objectivity; Will would be in this sense the tendency of bodies (or things) to act according to their qualities which under certain conditions, act in a certain way. Hydrogen has an affinity or tendency to unite with Oxygen in certain circumstance and this affinity or tendency would in those circumstances be called the "will" of the atoms of Hydrogen. This may be taken therefore as the wide sense of the term Will. And in this sense Al-Ghazali is correct, in so far as this tendency produces transformations and thereby destroys and creates forms; but it neither creates nor destroys

matter or force ; it is an inherent property or quality of matter and force and inseperable from them ; it is an abstract denoting certain features of reality. In its narrower and ordinary sense "will" is an attribute only of conscious beings. It is a conscious impulse to action brought about after a deliberation between the strongest ideas present in our consciousness. Before there can be will in this case there must be memory-structures present to receive perceptions ; thought-operations to arrange them, and ideas formed to explain them ; there is no action of will without a motive or without an end in view. Will might therefore be said to be, from an ethical standpoint, an expression of the character of the individual ; a disposition of one aspect of his conscience. While his conscience is itself a product of the whole organism, being partly due to heredity and partly to environment.

Ameer Ali in his work 'The Spirit of Islam' writes as follows :—

"The reactionary character of the influence exercised by Abu'l Hasan Ali Al-Ashaari and Ahmed Al-Ghazzali can hardly be over-estimated. It has been summed up in a few words by the learned editor of Al-Beiruni's *Al-Asarul-Bahuk*, but for Al-Ashaari and Al-Ghazzali the Arabs might have been a nation of Galileos, Keplers and Newtons. By their denunciations of science and philosophy, by their exhortations that, besides theology and law, no other knowledge was worth acquiring, they did more to stop the progress of the world than most other Muslim scholiasts, and up to this day their example is held forth as a reason for ignorance and stagnation." (Appendix p. 428-9.)

This statement takes no notice of the determining factor in the stagnation of Islamic civilization. The culture-forces failed. The Seljukees, Tartars and Mongols might learn from the Muslims they subdued and whose religion they adopted but they had no culture to impart in return and the tendency of their invasions was to break down what contacts existed by the paralysation of the social system. Christianity was at that period wallowing in filth and living in degradation ; she too had everything

to learn from the Muslim and nothing to give in return. The only source left from which to draw was nature, and investigation there was practically debarred by the unsettled state of the land owing to the repeated inroads of barbarianism. Besides, as learning depended principally on the patronage of rulers or of high officials, the rapid rise and fall of rulers and dynasties made any general culture practically impossible. Yet there is no doubt that the vast influence of both Al-Ash'ari' and Al-Ghazali tended to further the collapse. Their position was pure scepticism, but it was a scepticism of natural science and, like all ontological systems, drove man to seek enlightenment not in a study of nature but to look beyond phenomena for a subjective revelation in himself and to himself, but even this was an avenue of very little consequence since the natural basis of intellect had been destroyed. The manifestation of Existence and Existence itself become illusions; relationship was a non-entity, a mere phantom. What those men did not see was that their position destroyed not only their opponents but their own, they were part of the All—of reality—and if the all was an illusion, they themselves were illusions.

Macdonald sums up his influence on Islam as follows :—

"First, He led men back from scholastic labors upon theological dogmas to living contact with, study and exigencies of the Word and the traditions.

"Second, In his teachings and moral exhortations he introduced the element of fear.

"Third, It was by his influence sufiism attained a firm and assured position in the church of Islam.

"Fourth, He brought, philosophy and philosophical theology within the range of the ordinary mind."

"Of these four phases, the first and third are undoubtedly the most important. He made his mark by leading Islam back to its fundamental and historical facts, and by giving a place in its system to the religion's emotional life."

The historical part of a religion is no doubt of great importance, more especially when we justly recognise the fact that our soul is a continuance of the past ; it was before we were born and will be after we are dead. We are the product of the ages, the lives of the past are part of our being, they are us (enriched by further experience). We have been moulded by the past and as it moulded us so will we mould the future, we are the matrix, the womb from which its soul and body will issue forth. But the historical facts of a religion alone are nothing in themselves, they are only the centre around which ideas gravitate and which holds the body of thinkers together. The religion that relies on historical facts alone can never live in a world that is rich in mind-stuff and endowed with feeling. Man lives not on facts alone any more than he exists only on bread ; facts are but the data out of which the great world of mind is built ; where ideas are created and ideals formed, where truth only becomes revealed and the secrets of the universe made clear. Emotion in the religious life is necessary, for religion is the enthusiasm for applying to practical life the truths of which we are convinced. There is no value in life in itself. Our life is to us an opportunity for creating values ; the aim we pursue is the value of our life. The nobler and higher our ideals and the more enthusiastic our pursuit of those ideals ; of the more value will our life be ; recognising that we live, not principally for ourselves but humanity ; we are only a current in that great stream of life that flows ever onward from the past into the future ; from the known, into the unknown as the river of progress breaks through the barriers that oppose it. But our emotions should always be under control and be guided by Reason ; while enthusiasm for a cause is a grand thing we should be sure that the cause is right, that the aim is a noble one. An emotion that lands us in fanaticism, intolerance and dogma should have no place in our character, such emotions have in the past been the curse of creeds and have brought about deeds that are a disgrace to humanity. We have greater opportunities than ever our fathers had for seeking the truth and unravelling the problems of the universe, for they have left to us a mighty heritage of deeds and thoughts, enriched us with their experience, and it is our duty to follow the gleam.

But that duty should not be undertaken as a duty of fear, but as the aim and object of our existence, a duty that we should be proud to perform, bravely and courageously, not in fear and trembling. The great souls of the past live in us ; they speak to us in words and deeds, pointing out the path we must pursue and purpose we must bear in mind. What we want in this world is not men who pursue a certain path because they fear to tread another, but men ; strong for the right, who pursue the path because to them it is the path of duty and of truth ; men who will go down to death for that truth, singing as they fall the Marseillaise of humanity. Truth is the value of life and the goal of mind.

In putting material through a mill in the process of manufacture what you get out depends greatly on what you put in. Similarly, what comes out of the mill of a man's brain depends on what has been put into it. If the sources from which the inspiration is drawn are confused the result arrived at is likely to be confusion. It is therefore perhaps necessary that we should look at the source from which the Muslim thinkers drew not only their inspiration but the roots of terms they were using. To do this we have to go back to Aristotle and to point out the confusion that reigns in his definition of the word cause. We here find four meanings, as follows :—

- (1) "The formal cause, that which makes the thing such as it is.
- (2) The material cause, saying that the brass of a statue is its cause.
- (3) The start of the motion.
- (4) The end in view.

It is evident that in the acceptation of the above meanings we have a source of endless confusion. All four enter into causation, but only one, the third, is the cause, the motion through which the transformation takes place. The fourth is not a cause it is the aim or purpose, and when attained is the effect. The first and second are aspects demanding consideration in all transformation ; but neither the form nor the substance are causes ; as we have seen, causation is the transformation of substance,

Causation and evolution are one ; although in its narrow sense we are in the habit of applying the term causation to the transformation of empirical form only , forgetting that causation has as much to do with the formation of Man's character and the transformation of ideas or the development of mind. To understand phenomena therefore a study of evolution in its widest aspect is a necessity ; it is the master key wherewith we can solve the problems of nature and understand the reality of mutation and the mutation of reality ; the key to unlock the secretest chambers of the universe. With it we probe depths that to our fathers seemed unfathomable. We pierce to depths they could not reach and ascend to heights they could not climb. We can limn ideals they never limned and rise to thoughts they never knew.

The rocks and rivers, stars and suns
 Repeat the same eternal theme ;
 The same unchanging process runs
 In starry drift and gaseous stream.
 All things are aspects of a whole,
 Parts of causation's sovran chain ;
 One law directs the human soul
 The meteors in the solar train.

* * * *


Before, behind, on every hand,
 Are pearls divine, of priceless lore,
 To him who asks ; at his command
 Nature will yield a lavish store ;
 The mount, the vale, the shrub, the tree
 And every flower in every dell,
 The rushing river, sighing sea,
 And every soul a story tell,
 And he who wills and can delight
 In seeking truth where'er it be
 Will find the prize within his sight
 And learn the priceless prize is free

No more the past shall trouble him
No more the future cast a fear ;
The present doth Nirvana limn
And fairest vistas open clear,

* * * *

He who has drank the crystal tide
Has triumphed over Life's decay ;
The world's desires are cast aside
He reigns immortal, lives for aye ;
The mind is but a restless sea
Where strong opposing passions start :
To know the truth is rich to be
For truth is its immortal path.

(From an unpublished MS)



DE BOER ON GREEK-PHILOSOPHY.

IN the foregoing articles I have referred to De Boer's *Philosophy in Islam*. I now wish to draw attention to an error which helps to stultify his opinion of Islamic thought; an error which has been often exposed, more especially by J. M. Robertson, M. P., but which, in spite of all exposure, crops up again and again. It reminds me of one of those spring Aunt Sallys that you see at fairs, you have no sooner knocked it down than it springs up again. It springs up too in the writings of leading thinkers, more so in the works of specialists, devoted to a single subject. It is the fallacy of national characteristics; the fallacy of a "National" genius or a "National" mind. Gobineau represents Babism "as growing out of the 'innate' pantheism of the Iranian mind." Professor Browne introducing the Isma'ili doctrine says:—

"Abdullah B. Maymun and his ally the wealthy astrologer, Dandan, exerted themselves as they did to propagate the system about to be described, not because it was Persian, but because, being Persian, it strongly appealed to their Persian minds." (*Lit Hist. of Persia*).

Now try and think out from the above why it was they propagated the doctrine; because it appealed to their Persian minds. Now why did it appeal to their Persian minds? Because it was Persian, *ergo* they propagated it because it was Persian. Professor Browne has been arguing in a circle, and because he has approached the idea from a different aspect and given it a different wording, he fails to recognise it as the same. To say they adopted it because they were Persians, and because it was "Persian" is simply asserting that it is impossible for a Persian to do anything but think in a certain grove; if this were so all Persians would think alike; and not only them but all other nations; thought would become an incoherent jumble of ideas.

Hearken: There never was an "innate" pantheism and there never was a "Persian" mind. Of no nation has this fallacy been oftener repeated than of the Greeks; yet it has

been long since killed and it is time it was buried for ever. It is this fallacy as applied to "Greece" by De Boer, with which we have to deal. He says :—"Prior to its contact with Hellenism the Semitic mind had proceeded no further in the path of philosophy than the propounding of enigmas." As if there were no enigmas propounded by Greek philosophy. Again :—"But it was only in the priestly circles of ancient Babylonia.....that men rose to a more scientific consideration of the World." If this is so, what does his later statement that "Philosophy is a Greek conception" amount to ? Secondly, were the Babylonians Semites ? All races are mixed, composed of complex elements, but according to the generally accepted meaning of the term Semite the predominating influence in Babylonia was at least Semitic and had been since the invasion of Sargon I.

He goes still further saying :—"We have no right in deference to the taste of the day, to allot an undue amount of space in our description to the childish thought of pious Hindoos." Is Hindoo philosophy the only philosophy wherein we can trace childish thoughts and piety ? Are not all our thoughts childish at an early stage of our existence ? And is not that childish stage the preparation for the adult man ? Even amid the noblest and the bravest figures that humanity has produced can we not find some thoughts and acts that might be termed childish ? But do these keep us from recognising and acknowledging the glory and the majesty of the leaders of the race ? Is Salah-ed-din not the grander, the more majestic, the more lovable, because he sometimes wept ?

Yet De Boer had previously written :—"Nor did the logical and metaphysical speculations of the Indians remain unknown to the Muslims." Are the terms logical and metaphysical to him synonyms of childish and pious ? If not, how are we to reconcile the two passages ? A little further on we find him writing :—"Not the Indian imagination but the Greek mind was needed to direct the reflective processes to the knowledge of the Real", and this after he had just acknowledged that a scientific system had arisen earlier in Babylonia. Was Babylonia a Greek mind ?

Mr. Benn in his work on *The Greek Philosophers* (i. 42) says :—

“The Athenians had no genius for natural science, none of them were ever distinguished as savans.....it was, they thought, a miserable trifling (and) waste of time.”

It is possible that Benn here repeats the fallacy we are dealing with in its negative form, but, apart from that, the statement is correct in point of fact. No community that ever existed had a genius for natural or any other science ; individuals belonging to a community may have, but communities never. (For a fuller discussion *see Robertson's Hist. of Free Thought.*) Before passing to the principal point let me give the sentence which immediately follows the last already quoted from De Boer :—

“The best example of this is furnished by Arabian Mathematics. In the opinion of those who know the subject best, almost the only thing Indian in it is the Arithmetic, while the Algebra and Geometry are Greek preponderatingly if not exclusively.”

The fact is, as Oelner has pointed out, Algebra among the Greeks was confined to furnishing amusement “for the plays of the goblet.” The Arabs created spherical trigonometry, applied Algebra to Geometry ; introduced the tangent and substituted the sine for the arc in trigonometrical calculations. Now to come to the main thesis. De Boer says :—

“Philosophy is a phenomenon so unique—so thoroughly indigenous and so independent a growth of Grecian soil—that one might regard it as being exempt from the conditions of general civilized life, and as being explicable only *per se*.”

De Boer condemns what he calls “the childish thoughts of pious Hidoos,” yet, to explain Greek philosophy, he himself throws scientific method overboard and resorts to the supernatural. To me it seems pure superstition to remain in such an attitude, Philosophy like every other science, had a natural development and its rise in Greece can be explained quite easily in the ordinary terms of

evolutionary development without in any way falling back on an extramundane source. The civilisation of Greece, as a distinguished sociologist has pointed out was "Naturally the product of the greatest possible complex of culture forces. Greek philosophy and art alike drew their first inspirations from Eastern contact."

Taking our stand upon this natural explanation of Grecian development, it is now our duty to attempt to ascertain the sources in which it had its rise. So far as art is concerned we may accept the dictum of Whistler:—

"A favourite faith, dear to those who teach, is that certain periods were especially artistic, and that nations, readily named, were notably lovers of art. So we are told that the Greeks were, as a people, worshippers of the beautiful; and that in the fifteenth century art was ingrained in the multitude.....Listen; There never was an artistic period. There never was as art-loving nation."

Archæological investigations have revealed to us the remains of ancient civilisations that existed in Argolis long before the so-called Hellenes came into prominence; the ruins show us that art under them had reached a high level. Professor Shuckburgh, in his history of Greece, says,—

"The men who produced this civilisation not only worked in gold and bronze and made vessels and ornaments of great beauty, but they had attained to a high standard of skill in representing living figures, both of men and animals, and built great palaces and fortifications (p. 11)."

The discoveries being now made in Crete show us that long before the Mycenæan age there existed there, on a soil that was afterwards Greek a great civilisation where the arts had reached a high standard in the working of both bronze, stone and clay. And the decline of this civilisation was contemporary with the beginnings of Hellas. Professor Shuckburgh goes as far as to say, "The specimens of the statuary's art found there throw light upon the tradition of the cunning of Dædalus who first made statues walk." The Pelasgoi entered Greece proper when

art in Crete was still flourishing, though whether they came from that island or not is uncertain. There can be no doubt that those early civilisations had a large influence on the later art of the Hellenes which itself underwent a progressive development promoted as it was by religion and athleticism. An examination of the statuary remains of early Greece previous to the Persian wars (490-478) shows that the art of the Hellenes was still in a crude state and had made no advancement on that of Crete even if it had progressed as far. We have at this period the difficulty of representing posture and drapery and the eyes and hair. Besides, we have to note that some states contributed practically nothing to Hellenic art. Where is the poetry of Sparta? Where are her sculptors they might be counted on the fingers of one-hand? Yet Sparta was Greek. It took years of development to create a general taste for art even among the educated and the leisured classes, and after the taste was developed the majority were mere dilettante and amateurs, the true artistic talent was, as Professor Mahaffy says, "always rare and special." In Asia and Egypt are to be found the sources of contact that gave the first inspiration to Greek literature; the earliest poets were either from Asia or the Islands and the Ionic Alphabet in which they wrote was at least in great part derived from Phoenicia. Prose literature also began with the Ionic school, having its centre at Miletus. Shuckburgh writes:—"Simonides was an islander and Pindar was a Boeotian and the most noteworthy of their contemporaries came from other islands or states, while Herodotus the historian of the Persian wars was a native of Caria." If Greek art and literature was built upon earlier models and had a natural development it would be indeed strange if Greek philosophy was "innate" in the "Grecian" mind. If they received the first inspiration for art and literature from earlier civilisations in Argolis and Crete, Asia and Egypt, it is a rational proposition that they may have received their first philosophical reflections from the same sources. And even though direct proof may be wanting the natural explanation is more probable than the "innate," which is simply supernaturalism and for which there is no rational basis; it gives no explanation and fails to satisfy the

reason. De Boer himself acknowledges that in Babylonian men had "arisen to a more scientific consideration of the world." While speaking of the later cosmogony, Professor Sayce even goes as far as to say,—“Under the thin disguise of theological nomenclature, the Babylonian theory of the universe has become a philosophical materialism.” There are signs even in early Phœnicia of an attempt to purify religion and rise to a higher ethical standard, though we have as yet very little means of ascertaining how far it had developed. Thales, generally called the first philosopher, was a native of Miletus and is said to have been of Phœnician descent, not only so but he was in the Babylonian sphere of culture, and, like Homer, starts from the Babylonian conception of a beginning of all things in water. (*Robertson's Hist. of Free thought*). In Egypt also there had been a slow but decided advancement both in philosophy and ethics, there are also symptoms of a tendency to quasi-atheism as shown by their materialistic hymns. Grote acknowledges that Egyptian contact enlarged the range of their thoughts. It has to be particularly noted that philosophy arose not in Greece proper but in the colonies of Asia and spread through Italy and the Islands and that it took it generations to reach and vitalise the “innate” genius of the mind of the Greeks on the mainland. It was in the Italian colonies that philosophy made its first most notable progress. Pythagoras was at Croton (530-510). Xenophon in Sicily and Italy was teaching purer doctrines as to the Gods. A school arose at Elea beginning with Parmenides and Empedocles. If there is one point more prominent than another in connection with Grecian philosophy it is, that speculation first began in the colonies where contact with foreign thought was most complex and where new ideas were ever presenting themselves for solution, and that philosophy travelled inward from there to Greece proper and not outward as it ought to have done had it been “innate” in the “Grecian” mind. It is only about the fifth century that we find the tendency of the teachers is to drift to Athens.

As Professor Shuchburg says :—

“The earliest poets as we have seen, were mostly from Asia and the Islands; the earliest philosophers

Ionia, Sicily and Italy and the earliest historians from Miletus ; Even in the Periclean age the chief seat of mental philosophy was Elea in Italy and the leaders of a new physical philosophy came from Thrace and Asia."

To me it seems that this point is decisive as to the rise of Grecian philosophy by natural forces to be found in natural conditions of culture-contact, and it destroys any conception of an "innate" mind or genius, either Grecian or other. It may be as well to look at it from another standpoint. Time and again we find opposition to the expenditure on art ; we also find philosophers complaining that more honour is paid to athletics than to wisdom, in other words the mass of the Greek population followed athletics rather than art, literature or science, just as at the present day the mass of the British people follow racing and football and other sports. Science and literature and art are always the pastime and prerogative of the few. Again, Athens expelled Anaxagoras because of his speculations on the nature and origin of the universe ; they poisoned Socrates and often showed their antipathy to learning and speculation. To the average Greek, scientists and philosophers were what they have always been and what they are at the present day to the multitude, heretics or infidels. Where was the Greek mind here ? Were the populace, was the multitude not Greek ? Are we to recognise the Greek mind only in the few not in the many ? Greek civilisation can only be explained in a satisfactory manner by natural forces. As J. M. Robertson says :—

"The later supremacy of the Greek culture is thus to be explained in terms not of an abnormal 'Greek Genius,' but of the special evolution of intelligence in the Greek-speaking stock, firstly through constant crossing with others, secondarily through its furtherance by the special social condition of the more progressive Greek city-states, of which conditions the most important were their geographical dividedness, and their own consequent competition and interaction."

This writer has in his Introduction to English Politics (chap. IV) laid down very clearly the laws of sociological

development and I need not here repeat them but simply refer the reader to that work. In our summing up we recognise that there is no such thing as an "innate" idea or an "innate" science even in the individual, and no such thing as a "national" mind. Mind is a development of the evolutionary process as much as the body ; it is a product of the ages. Knowledge is the accumulated facts and the relations of these facts ascertained by methodical arrangement, drawn from the realm of human experience : it is neither the property of one race or another but the common heritage of all mankind. All nations and all individuals have added their quota to the sum of human experience. The present is the consummation of the labour of the past and the starting point of the future. Every generation that has vanished built upon the generations that proceeded it. And the roots of all our sciences, literatures and philosophies lie far back in the simple thought-operations of primitive man and their first development in the primeval lore or savages.

The mind is as it were a great river flowing ever onward from the past into the future and the individual souls are the individual drops that go to form the great body of its waters, while the grand civilisations of the past and the present mark the centre of the current where the stream flows strongest. All our thoughts, our ideals and our aspirations, our poetries and our histories, our sciences and our philosophies are currents in that great ocean of mind ; whose waves are ever breaking down the barriers of the unknown and bringing it within the realm of knowledge ; solving the problems exhibited through experience in the manifestations of reality ; tearing aside the veil of Maya, baring the form of Isis and revealing the Truth.

Lift I say the flag of Islam
Place it on the hills again,
Every beauteous fold revealing
To the world-wide sons of men ;


You remember how your fathers
On the hill-tops of the world
Careless of all opposition
Every spotless fold unfurled.

Let us follow their example,
Staunch of heart and strong of hand,
Till the sacred light of learning
Brightens every Muslim land ;

In the thunder of the conflict
Raise the voice and wield the pen,
We shall plant the flag of Islam
In the fields of thought again ;

Even as the Lord Muhammed
In the " Times of Ignorance,"
Touched the heart and broke the idols
Of Arabia's pagan lance.

Then, all worthy sons of Islam,
Gird your armour on I say,
For the morning light is dawning
Heralding the coming day.





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Philos
Parkinson, J. Yehya-en-Nasr
p2477e
Essays on Islamic philosophy.

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